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A RESTRAINED PLEA FOR  
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY 
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE 
RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE. J. Harvie Wilkinson 
III.1 New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 2012. Pp. xii 
+ 161. $21.95 (cloth). 
Lino A. Graglia2 
I. THE PROBLEM: POLITICAL JUDGING 
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III’s slim volume, Cosmic 
Constitutional Theory: Why Americans Are Losing Their 
Inalienable Right to Self-Governance, is a heartfelt but somewhat 
contradictory plea for judicial restraint and protest of judicial 
supremacy. There can be no doubt there is reason for complaint. 
It has become routine and unquestioned that the most basic 
issues of contemporary public policy, such as corporate 
campaign contributions,3 gun control,4 term limits,5 same-sex 
marriage,6 and voting rights,7 are to be decided not by elected 
legislators, state or federal, but for the nation as a whole by 
majority vote of the nine Supreme Court Justices. Given the 
pronounced four-four liberal-conservative split on the present 
Court, they are typically decided, as was each of the noted issues, 
by a single vote, the vote of Justice Kennedy, making him 
arguably our most important public official in terms of domestic 
social policy, performing a role similar to that of the Ayatollah in 
Iran. This is not the “Republican form of Government” 
promised by the Constitution.8 
 1. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
 2. A. W. Walker Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. 
 3. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 4. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 5. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 6. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 7. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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It is not “cosmic constitutional theory,” however, that has 
taken us “down the road to judicial hegemony” (p. 4), as Judge 
Wilkinson thinks, although he admits that “the justices do not go 
around citing theorists” (p. 8), and those “inclined to find their 
own political preferences in the Constitution can accomplish that 
goal without the assistance of theory” (p. 9). The fact, however, 
is that the Constitution—and therefore theories of constitutional 
interpretation—have very little to do with the Court’s 
constitutional decisions or, at least, its rulings of 
unconstitutionality. Rarely does a ruling of unconstitutionality 
turn on an issue of interpretation. The basis of the consistent and 
predictable liberal-conservative split of the Justices, almost 
regardless of the issue, is ideological, not semantic, the result of 
different policy preferences, not different ways of reading the 
Constitution. No one believes, presumably, that the liberals 
consistently vote to protect and the conservatives to limit 
abortion rights,9 for example, because they find different 
meanings in “due process,” the ostensible basis of the abortion 
decisions. 
But even if constitutional theory “does not provide the 
rationale for politicized judging,” Judge Wilkinson argues, “it at 
least provides the cover, making the expedition into activism 
appear more respectable or more defensible than it otherwise 
would” (p. 9). He provides “admittedly an arbitrary and far too 
abbreviated list” (p. 6) of supposed theories of constitutional 
interpretation: “the living constitutionalism of William Brennan, 
the originalism of Robert Bork, the political process theory of 
John Hart Ely, the textualism of Hugo Black, the minimalism of 
Cass Sunstein, the cost-benefit pragmatism of Richard Posner, 
the active liberty of Stephen Breyer [and] the moral readings of 
Ronald Dworkin” (p. 5). The remainder of the book mercifully 
consists of discussion of only four of these: living 
constitutionalism, originalism, political process theory, and 
pragmatism, devoting a chapter to and analyzing the “vices” and 
“virtues” of each. 
II. THE SOLUTION: NONPOLITICAL ORIGINALISM 
Judge Wilkinson castigates them all in that their “great 
casualty . . . has been our inalienable right of self-governance” 
(p. 9). His many so-called theories of interpretation, however, 
 9. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  
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basically reduce to two: originalism and non-originalism, neither 
of which is really a theory of interpretation. Originalism, the 
view that the Constitution should, like any writing, be 
understood to mean what its authors intended it to mean is less a 
theory of interpretation than a statement of what, in ordinary 
usage, interpretation means. The other three “theories” 
Wilkinson discusses, on the other hand, are less theories of 
interpretation than arguments for deciding constitutional cases 
on non-interpretatist, i.e., non-originalist, grounds. The real 
debate, therefore, is not over how to interpret the Constitution 
but whether the Constitution should be the only basis for 
constitutional decisionmaking. The function of so-called theories 
of interpretation is to claim that constitutional decisions based 
on some alternative to originalism, such as natural law, tradition, 
or moral principle, are nonetheless somehow connected to the 
Constitution and some objective source of values and therefore 
are not simply products of the judges’ policy preferences. 
Because the Constitution became authoritative only when 
ratified by the states, the ratifiers are in effect its true authors, 
and it should be understood to mean what it was understood to 
mean, as best we can tell, by them and the people they 
represented, that is, the original public understanding. There is 
no other objective source of constitutional meaning, all others 
amounting, as a practical matter, to a transference of 
policymaking power from legislators or other government 
officials to judges.  
Two objections are typically made to this argument by non-
originalists. The first is that we may not know the original public 
understanding as to a contemporary issue, or, most likely, the 
issue was never considered. Very true, but the purpose of 
judicial review, at least in theory, is to enforce the Constitution, 
not authorize judges to substitute their views for the views of 
legislators. If the Constitution does not clearly prohibit a policy 
choice, the only conclusion for a judge consistent with 
representative self-government is that it is not prohibited. The 
prohibition should be clear because, first, in a democracy, the 
opinion of legislators should prevail over the opinion of judges in 
cases of doubt, and second, constitutional restrictions, inherently 
anti-democratic, should not be favored, new ones should be 
imposed only for good reasons, and existing ones should not be 
expanded. 
The second objection to having the Constitution mean only 
what it was originally understood to mean is that the result is  
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that present-day policy choices are controlled by the “dead hand 
of the past.”10 The Constitution wisely precludes few policy 
choices and even fewer that modern legislators might want to 
make, but as to those it does preclude (e.g., compelling 
testimony by the defendant in federal criminal trial),11 the 
objection is correct. It is an objection, however, not to 
originalism, but to judicially enforced constitutionalism, and is a 
good reason, as just stated, not to favor constitutional 
restrictions.  
Judge Wilkinson does not define the “activism” he protests, 
but it can most usefully be defined in constitutional law as a 
court disallowing as unconstitutional a policy choice that the 
Constitution does not clearly prohibit.12 Judicially enforced 
constitutionalism is rule by the dead hand of the past, which 
should be disfavored; activism is rule by judges, which should, at 
least, be recognized as such, not obscured by putative theories of 
constitutional interpretation. If judicial activism is to be 
prevented or limited and judicial review made consistent with 
democracy, as Wilkinson urges, it cannot be by pleading with the 
Justices to ignore supposed constitutional theories of 
interpretation and exercise self-restraint. It can only be by 
judicial review being made in practice what it is in theory: the 
justices refusing to disallow as unconstitutional legislative policy 
choices that the Constitution doesn’t clearly disallow, with the 
legislative choice being allowed to prevail in cases of doubt.  
This was the insight that Harvard law professor James 
Bradley Thayer, the leading constitutionalist of his era, famously 
propounded at the end of the nineteenth century as “the rule of 
clear mistake.” It is not enough, he insisted, that a court 
 10. See letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept 6, 1789), in 15 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr. eds., 1958) 
(“[T]he earth belongs in usufruct to the living: . . . the dead have neither powers nor 
rights over it.”) Cf., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Inescapability of Constitutional Theory, 80 
U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 949–50 (2013) (reviewing Wilkinson, Cosmic Constitutional Theory). 
“The Constitution itself is profoundly antidemocratic. No one alive today participated in 
its drafting or ratification . . . . Even if the majority loathes it, or a part of it, the majority 
cannot change it unless a supermajority (as reflected in an action of two-thirds of both 
houses of Congress and three-fourths of the states) agrees.” Id. If the Constitution could 
not be amended, it seems, we would be stuck with a provision we loathe, forever or, at 
least, until the next revolution. 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 12. Examples of the opposite, the Supreme Court allowing as constitutional a policy 
choice that the Constitution does clearly prohibit, are very rare, not undemocratic, and 
examples of restraint, whether or not justified, rather than activism. Home Building & 
Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), upholding a clearly unconstitutional 
state debtor-relief law, is perhaps the clearest example.  
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“conclude[] that upon a just and true construction the law is 
unconstitutional . . . . It can only disregard the Act when those 
who have the right to make laws have not only made a mistake, 
but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to 
rational question.”13 The issue for courts is “not merely their 
own judgment as to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to 
what judgment is permissible to another department which the 
constitution has charged with the duty of making it.”14 
This was the rule Chief Justice John Marshall apparently 
adopted in justifying judicial review in Marbury v. Madison,15 
when he gave as an example of an unconstitutional law a law 
that permitted conviction for treason on the testimony of one 
witness while the Constitution explicitly requires two.16 It was 
also the rule often stated by the Court in early cases,17 though 
not the rule always applied when, as in Marbury, a law was held 
unconstitutional.18 It is certainly not the rule applied by the 
present Court, which considers itself authorized to remove any 
issue it chooses from the ordinary political process and assign it 
to itself for final decision. The rule of clear mistake would result 
in very few rulings of unconstitutionality, ending the activism 
and judicial hegemony that Judge Wilkinson protests, but 
unfortunately, it is not the rule he advocates. 
III. INVALID ALTERNATIVES 
A. LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Judge Wilkinson begins his critique of alleged theories of 
constitutional interpretation with a chapter titled “Living 
Constitutionalism: Activism Unleashed” (p. 10). To the extent 
that the purpose of a constitution is to impede change, a “living 
 13. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). 
 14. Id. 
 15. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
 17. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring) (“If any 
act of Congress, or of a Legislature of the state, violates those constitutional provisions, it 
is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a 
delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and 
urgent case.”); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 38 (1823) (stating “[the Court] will not declare 
an act, whether of the State or a national legislature, to be void, as being repugnant to the 
fundamental law, unless in a very clear case”). 
 18. After finding, questionably, that the 1789 Judiciary Act added to the Court’s 
original jurisdiction, it held, even more questionably, that that was prohibited by the 
Constitution, giving judicial review an unpromising start.  
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constitution” adaptable by judges to their view of changing 
conditions, is an oxymoron, no constitution at all. Like other 
alleged theories of constitutional interpretation, its function is to 
justify non-originalist constitutional rulings as something other 
than simply a result of the judges’ policy choices. The vice of 
“living constitutionalism,” Wilkinson points out, is that it “is a 
complete inversion of democratic primacy and turns the 
Constitution’s foremost premise of popular governance on its 
head,” and, quoting Justice Rehnquist, is “genuinely corrosive 
of the fundamental values of our democratic society” (p. 20). 
That, one might think, is quite enough to disqualify it as a 
method of constitutional interpretation. It is not enough for 
Wilkinson, however, because this vice, incredibly enough, is 
also its virtue; because it permits judges to exercise 
policymaking power that he believes, contrary to the supposed 
point of his book, they should have. 
Although living constitutionalism’s “encouragements to 
free-wheeling judging” may stand the Constitution on its head, it 
may also, Judge Wilkinson argues, give “the elected branches 
leeway to craft fruitfully modern definitions of terms like 
‘equality’ and ‘commerce’” (p. 16). It is strange to see judicial 
activism defended as necessary not, as usual, to restrict but to 
permit the exercise of legislative power, which ordinarily 
requires only judicial restraint. Congress does not need the 
Court’s intervention, as Wilkinson argues, to enable it to 
“eradicat[e] . . . invidious discrimination” or “deal with commercial 
developments” (p. 16). All it needs, on the contrary, is the 
Court’s refusal to intervene, a refusal that is almost always 
consistent with the theory of judicial review. 
It is true that Congress is limited to its enumerated powers, 
but they are so basic (taxation, interstate commerce, war)19 and 
so broadly stated and without specific limitations as to be 
difficult to confine, as history shows, making their scope almost 
always a policy question. This was the conclusion the Court 
strongly intimated at the beginning in, most notably, McCulloch 
v. Maryland20 and Gibbons v. Ogden.21 Congress’s powers to 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 20. 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819) (Congress may do whatever is “necessary,” defined to 
include “convenient,” for the exercise of its powers, and “the degree of its necessity . . . is 
to be discussed in another place”). 
 21. 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) (“The wisdom and discretion of Congress, their identity 
with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in 
this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints 
on which they have relied, to secure them from its [the commerce power’s] abuse”).  
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regulate interstate commerce and enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment should be enough to sustain its ability to deal with 
the issues Wilkinson refers to. There is much to be said for 
federalism, i.e., decentralized decisionmaking, but also for a 
national government able to deal with national problems, and it 
is not clear that the Court should have a strong role in resolving 
the conflict.22 
Judge Wilkinson is probably correct that the Court’s recent 
revival of restrictions on Congress’ commerce power is 
unjustified and unhelpful,23 but the corrective is, as he himself 
says, “a measure of restraint” (p. 18), which is not the usual 
mission of living constitutionalism. The Court’s invalidation, 
post Wilkinson’s book, of a major portion of the Affordable 
Care Act,24 the signature achievement of the President’s first 
term, is a striking example of the kind of power unelected judges 
probably would not have in a well-functioning democracy. 
Brown v. Board of Education25 is the trump card of 
defenders, including Judge Wilkinson, of judicial activism as 
“living constitutionalism.” As it is not politically, socially, or 
academically permissible to disagree with Brown, it is not 
possible, it would seem, to oppose activism. Thus originalism 
is refuted and rule by judges defended. Brown and its 
immediate successors prohibited all official race 
discrimination, a great achievement, but it did not and could 
not end school racial segregation, instead in effect giving the 
South a ten-year grace period for its continuance26 until 
Congress ended it with the 1964 Civil Rights Act. As 
important as Brown was for its holding, it was probably more 
important for the change it worked in the role of judges in our 
system of government. Although undoubtedly a great moral 
triumph, it led the Court to some other revolutionary 
decisions the morality of which is less clear.27 
 22. See Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the 
Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719 (1996). The essence of American Federalism is 
less that it limits Congress’ power than that it often requires Congress to exercise power 
by engaging in pretense. Thus, if Great Britain, say, decides to prohibit race 
discrimination by public accommodations, it prohibits it; Congress must pretend to be 
regulating interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241 (1964). 
 23. See Id. 
 24. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 26. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 27. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
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The Court that gave us Brown, it is well to remember, also 
gave us Dred Scott v. Sandford,28 which led to the Civil War and 
should have been enough to conclusively establish that judicial 
review is not an improvement in the science of government. It 
also gave us the 1883 Civil Rights Cases,29 which invalidated a 
congressional prohibition of racial segregation in public 
accommodations, allowing it to continue for nearly eighty more 
years. On the issue of race and the schools itself, it led to the 
failed social experiment of forced busing.30 Great as it is, Brown 
did not conclusively establish the superiority of judicial over 
legislative policymaking. 
B. POLITICAL ORIGINALISM 
Judge Wilkinson’s next chapter is titled “Originalism: 
Activism Masquerading as Restraint” (p. 33). Although 
originalism has many virtues, he concedes, including one that 
one might consider dispositive, the virtue of “legitimizing 
judicial review” (p. 44), it is, he finds, “not without real flaws” 
(p. 39). One of which is that as to “a vast number of 
controversial constitutional questions, originalism offers only 
ambiguous historical evidence, if any at all” (p. 46), and even 
when there is “a wealth of historical evidence concerning the 
original understanding” of a particular constitutional provision, 
it may be “varied enough to support any position” (p. 47). The 
result, in either case, Wilkinson concludes, is that “a judge is free 
to choose, perhaps at a subconscious level, whatever outcome 
seems desirable” (p. 47). When the “sources of wisdom conflict,” 
he quotes Prof. Mitchell Berman, “judges may have no choice 
but to follow their own convictions and moral intuitions” (p. 47). 
“A sad fact . . . at originalism’s heart,” Wilkinson further concludes, 
is that it “has failed to deliver on its promise of restraint,” and 
“[t]he fault lies with the theory itself” (p. 46). 
It is not true that judges faced with a constitutional 
challenge to a policy choice that the Constitution does not 
clearly prohibit have no choice but to rule on the basis of 
personal inclinations, and may, therefore, invalidate the choice 
as “unconstitutional” on a non-constitutional ground. They 
obviously have the choice of deciding not to intervene and 
 28. 60 U.S. 393 (1851). 
 29. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 30. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See LINO A. 
GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND 
THE SCHOOLS (1976).  
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letting the result of the ordinary political process stand. The 
only justification for judicial review, Judge Wilkinson and 
Professor Berman seem to forget, is that judges are authorized 
to enforce the prohibitions of a written Constitution. It takes a 
remarkable degree of confidence in the wisdom, knowledge, 
and trustworthiness of judges and distrust of popular 
government to believe that in the absence of a clear 
constitutional prohibition judges may invalidate laws on the 
basis of “whatever outcome seems desirable” or their “own 
convictions and moral intuitions.” It is not a defect of 
originalism that it would preclude judges from enforcing 
constitutional prohibitions that do not exist. 
If, as Judge Wilkinson states, self-declared “originalist 
judges have been among the worst offenders” (p. 46) in lack of 
restraint, the fault is not originalism’s, but the judges’. The gun 
control cases relied on by Wilkinson illustrate the problem. In 
District of Columbia v. Heller,31 the Court, with the usual five to 
four split, invalidated a District gun control measure, holding in 
an opinion by Justice Scalia, ostensibly on the basis of extensive 
historical research, that the Second Amendment grants an 
individual right to possess firearms. A four Justice dissenting 
opinion by Justice Stevens reached, ostensibly on the basis of 
equally extensive historical research, the opposite conclusion, 
and voted to uphold the law. While “[t]here is support” for the 
majority’s view, Wilkinson concludes, “there is also plenty of 
clear evidence to the contrary” (p. 58). “What was transparently 
contestable Heller portrayed as indisputable” (p. 58). In an 
earlier writing, he had argued forcefully in favor of the 
dissenters’ position.32 The close division of opinion alone should 
have been enough to indicate that the Second Amendment did 
not so clearly settle the issue as to justify the Court in 
overturning the District’s law. A presumption of 
constitutionality based on deference to elected legislators and 
the rationality of letting current problems be solved on the basis 
of current knowledge and conditions should have been enough 
to persuade the majority that they were not required to 
intervene. 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,33 Judge Wilkinson points 
out, the Court, with the same five to four split, applied the 
 31. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 32. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 
95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009). 
 33. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).  
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Heller result to the states by holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was meant to “incorporate” the Second. Rather 
than supporting rejection of originalism, as Wilkinson argues, 
the result clearly illustrates its misuse to reach an apparently 
favored result. A restrained originalist would and should have 
found that it is not clear that the Second Amendment creates 
an individual right of gun ownership and even less clear, in any 
event, that the Fourteenth Amendment makes that right 
applicable to the states. 
Judge Wilkinson sees U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton34 as 
a further argument against originalism. The Court, again by a 
five to four decision, but this time with the four conservatives in 
dissent and the liberals in the majority by reason of being joined 
by Justice Kennedy, invalidated a state law that effectively 
imposed term limits on the state’s federal representatives. Again, 
both the majority (by Justice Stevens) and minority (Justice 
Thomas) opinions relied on extensive historical research, only to 
arrive at opposite conclusions. It turns out, Wilkinson concludes, 
that, as usual, the “original understanding,” if any, of the issue is 
“unclear” (p. 48). “Originalism thus offers no guidance on the 
issue, setting judges adrift . . . in these unchartered waters” where 
they “may be tempted to latch on to familiar personal preferences 
for direction” (p. 48). 
Judge Wilkinson’s apparent assumption—probably inevitable 
for judges armed with judicial review—is that all laws require 
judicial approval for their validity. It is not true that a judge faced 
with a challenge to a law the Constitution does not clearly 
prohibit is left “adrift” with the often difficult problem of having 
to decide whether he approves of it. He should, if he 
understands and adheres to the basis of judicial review, see that 
he has no problem at all: a policy choice not clearly prohibited 
by the Constitution is not unconstitutional. 
As already noted, the fact that the Justices divide almost 
evenly on a constitutional issue should ordinarily be enough, it 
would seem, at least for a restrained originalist judge, to 
conclude that the alleged constitutional prohibition is not 
sufficiently clear to justify overruling the legislative judgment. 
The additional fact that the division, as on all of the issues noted 
at the beginning of this review, is typically along clear ideological 
lines is further reason to suspect that invalidation of the 
 34. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).  
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legislative policy choice may not have been the inevitable result 
of a clear constitutional command. 
Judge Wilkinson’s objection to originalism amounts to little 
more than that it is not living constitutionalism and would 
therefore, if followed, preclude some Supreme Court decisions 
of which he highly approves. It would, in his view, “require . . . 
overturning a whole host of rights on which citizens now rely,” 
“turn back the clock on matters of personal privacy,” and 
“restore antiquated notions of inequality” (pp. 14–15). This 
objection leaves very little, however, of his plea for judicial 
restraint. One cannot effectively complain of judicial activism 
while lauding some of its results. It is true that originalism would 
(if stare decisis is overcome) remove many Court imposed 
restrictions on legislators, or at least prevent the Court from 
imposing new ones, but it would merely return the policy issues 
involved to the ordinary political process, which should not in a 
democracy be presumptively suspect. Some rights, such as the 
right to harass mourners at military funerals35 may be lost as a 
result of reinstated state laws, but the corresponding right of 
mourners not to be harassed would be gained. There is almost 
always a trade-off. 
It is true that an originalist Court would not have been able 
to find a “right to privacy” in the “penumbras, formed by 
emanations” from the Bill of Rights, as the Court did in 
Griswold v. Connecticut,36 but that would not necessarily have 
been a loss. For one thing, it would have saved the nation from 
the embarrassment of government by farce. For another, it is not 
clear that the Court’s creation of a near-absolute right to an 
abortion that the decision led to has proved to be a good policy 
choice from any point of view. Rather than resolving the 
abortion issue, the Court’s intervention seems to have served to 
make it more divisive and the right more vulnerable than it 
would otherwise have been. The Court’s abortion decisions have 
created a four-decade pitiable spectacle of the states devising 
new means of impeding abortions and then pathetically pleading 
with the Court not to strike them down.37 
The nation’s enactment of broad civil rights and voting 
rights laws, honoring Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., uniquely, with 
a day of his own, and election and re-election of a black 
 35. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 36. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 37. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).   
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president should lessen Judge Wilkinson’s fear that except for 
the Court the people might “restore antiquated notions of 
inequality.” They might, it is true, restore some of the laws 
invalidated by the Court, such as those that gave preference to 
in-wedlock over out-of-wedlock births.38 Only the extreme 
skepticism about democracy and distrust of the American people 
that is characteristic of liberal constitutional scholars can explain 
the belief that it is only the Supreme Court that is saving the 
nation from oppression.39 Wilkinson’s acceptance of that belief 
to a large extent makes his plea for restraint contradictory 
and futile. 
C. POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY 
Judge Wilkinson’s next chapter, “Political Process Theory: 
A Third Way Down the Rabbit Hole” (p. 60), discusses 
Professor John Hart Ely’s book, Democracy and Distrust: A 
Theory of Judicial Review.40 Although purportedly rejecting 
living constitutionalism which he denounced as turning the 
Court into a “council of legislative revision,” Ely also rejected 
originalism, which he considered “incapable of keeping faith 
with the evident spirit” of certain allegedly “open-textured” 
constitutional provisions (p. 62). If the Constitution has “open-
textured” provisions, however, it is largely because the Court has 
made them so by divorcing them from their original meaning, 
and a warrant to enforce the “spirit” of such provisions cannot 
be a prescription for restraint. 
Following the famous “footnote four” in Justice Stone’s 
Carolene Products41 opinion, Professor Ely would confine the 
Court’s constitutional decisionmaking to enforcing the 
“specifics” of the Bill of Rights, correcting “malfunctions” of the 
political “market,” and preventing improper discrimination 
against “discrete and insular minorities” (pp. 63–64). Judges 
would thus, he argued, need to make only “procedural” 
decisions, at which they are expert, rather than “substantive” 
decisions, which are for the legislature. Judge Wilkinson believes 
that Ely’s theory has the merit of rejecting both originalists, who 
 38. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 39. It is surely even more true today than it was in 1893 that “we are much too apt 
to think of the judicial power of revising the acts of the other departments as our only 
protection against oppression and ruin.” Thayer, supra note 13, at 137. 
 40. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980). 
 41. Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 155 n.4 (1938).  
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“lob the hand grenade of democratic accountability,” and living 
constitutionalists, who “respond by firing back the dead-hand 
fallacy, contending that it is equally undemocratic to let long-
dead individuals make value judgments for us” (p. 67). This 
attempt at “moral equivalence” is not valid. Democratic 
accountability is the basis of government legitimacy, while the 
“dead-hand” objection, as previously noted, is an objection not 
to originalism but to constitutionalism. 
On the “vice” side of the ledger, Judge Wilkinson points 
out that having the courts police democracy, as Ely 
recommends, necessarily involves value judgments. Whether 
Citizens United v. FEC,42 invalidating a federal law 
restricting corporate campaign contributions, for example, 
improved the political marketplace by making more speech 
available or impaired it by permitting wealth to drown out 
other speech, is highly debatable. Similarly, Ely’s 
requirement of close judicial scrutiny of “we-they” 
distinctions to prevent disadvantaging members of groups to 
which the legislators do not belong involves “the slippery 
task of discerning who is ‘we’ and who is ‘they,’” “presages a 
constitutional law of class warfare,” and could “undo almost 
every legislative classification on the books” (p. 75). 
Although, “[t]o his credit,” Ely talks the talk of judicial 
restraint (p. 69), Wilkinson concludes, his theory “is a 
prescription for an emboldened judicial role unsupported by 
the Constitution and covered by little more than a fig leaf of 
restraint (p. 79). The “source” of his theory, after all, was the 
Warren Court, which was “‘activist’ or ‘interventionist’ by 
any measure of the term” (p. 63). 
D. PRAGMATISM 
Finally, Judge Wilkinson devotes a chapter titled 
“Pragmatism: Activism through Antitheory” (p. 80) to Judge 
Richard Posner’s “pragmatism,” which, far from being a 
cosmic constitutional theory, “prides itself upon being 
anything but” (p. 83). Posner, a Holmesian legal realist, 
would inject a high degree of candor into judicial 
decisionmaking by recommending that judges openly base 
their decisions on their likely “effects” rather than the 
“language of a statute or a case, or more generally on a 
preexisting rule” (p. 82). 
 42. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
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Pragmatism has the virtue, Judge Wilkinson believes, of 
providing a flexibility that enables judges to escape imposing 
“eighteenth-century solutions,” or non-solutions, on “twenty-
first century problems” (p. 84). “Given the magnitude of the 
problems we call on the Constitution to solve, pragmatism 
serves as a safety valve. The Constitution ‘is not a suicide pact’ 
and pragmatism helps keep it that way” (p. 85). Pragmatic 
judging is needed, that is, to permit us to escape from unhelpful 
or harmful constitutional restrictions or requirements. The 
difficulty with this argument is that although there are some 
such restrictions or requirements—the president must be a 
“natural born Citizen,”43 and Wyoming, as well as California, 
must have two Senators44—they are very rarely the subject of 
judicial activism, the effect of which is almost always not to 
escape constitutional restrictions but to create new ones, not to 
widen, but to limit legislative policy choices. Nor is there any 
real issue of “the magnitude of the problems we call on the 
Constitution to solve,” because the Constitution has little to do 
with most contemporary problems. It cannot often be used to 
solve, but neither does it often present an impediment to 
solving, contemporary problems. It is the Court that we call 
upon to solve our problems, which is what Wilkinson is rightly, 
though ineffectively, objecting to. 
Judge Posner argues that by frankly recognizing judges’ 
policymaking role, pragmatism may, paradoxically, 
encourage not activism but restraint. It “may help convince 
judges of the legislature’s relative superiority,” and that they 
“likely lack both the relevant data and the democratic 
responsiveness needed for effective policymaking, not to 
mention the ability to appropriately process . . . scientific 
and political inputs” (p. 86). Similarly, the Supreme Court’s 
frank recognition that it is “inescapably a political court 
when it is deciding constitutional cases” may “let it at least 
be restrained in the exercise of its power, recognizing the 
subjective character, the insecure foundations, of its 
constitutional jurisprudence” (p. 146 n. 75). 
Judge Wilkinson responds that Judge Posner may be “a 
victim of his own agile and wide-ranging intellect” (p. 102), 
because pragmatism is “the antithesis of restraint” (p. 94). 
“Pragmatic judges are ‘forward-looking’ and ‘future-oriented,’ 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.  
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have a ‘taste for empirical inquiry,’ and lack any sense of duty to 
the source of legal authority. In a very real sense, these attributes 
mean pragmatists aren’t really judges after all . . . .” (p. 95). 
IV. CONCLUSION: ACTIVISM IS BAD  
EXCEPT WHEN IT’S VERY GOOD 
In his concluding chapter, Judge Wilkinson quotes with 
approval Judge Learned Hand’s well-known statement that he 
would find it “most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic 
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly 
do not” (p. 112). Judge Hand took a position that came close to 
questioning the legitimacy of judicial review.45 Wilkinson’s 
position, on the contrary, amounts to objecting to rule by the 
Supreme Court except when it produces decisions he strongly 
approves. In addition to Brown, these include Gideon v. 
Wainwright,46 Reynolds v. Sims,47 and Miranda v. Arizona.48 
These “[m]ajor activist decisions of the Warren Court,” he 
believes, “have rightly stood the test of time” (p. 111). He 
recognizes that this explicit approval of activism “doubtless 
strengthens the belief of today’s interventionists that tomorrow 
may smile on their bolder efforts too.” (p. 111) But that belief is 
unwarranted, he assures us, because “[t]hey are wrong” (p. 111). 
His approval of some activist decisions is not inconsistent 
with his plea for restraint, Judge Wilkinson argues, because 
those decisions “vindicated foundational principles essential to 
the functioning of our nation,” and refusal by the Court to 
intervene would have left the Constitution “bereft of meaning” 
(p. 111). Judicial review on the basis of unstated “foundational 
principles,” however, is contradictory of the judicial review 
justified in Marbury v. Madison as simply enforcement of a 
written Constitution. More importantly, Wilkinson’s 
justifications are not true: the nation managed to function before 
the decisions he approves were made—as to some of them, it 
arguably functioned better. None of them comes close, even 
discounting for hyperbole, to passing his test of being required to 
prevent the Constitution from being “bereft of meaning.” 
 45. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958) (“[S]ince this power [judicial 
review] is not a logical deduction from the structure of the Constitution but only a 
practical condition upon its successful operation, it need not be exercised whenever a 
court sees, or thinks that it sees, an invasion of the Constitution”). 
 46. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (criminal defendant’s right to state-supported counsel). 
 47. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (one-person, one-vote). 
 48. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (warning of Fifth Amendment rights).  
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“Those who wish to insert the courts into such contestable 
disputes” as “the precise reach of eminent domain or regulatory 
takings or the value of same-sex marriage or the utility of 
firearms regulations,” Judge Wilkinson advises, “would do well 
to remember that even the near misses of judicial activism 
expose its true dangers” (p. 111). Unfortunately, they are 
unlikely to be convinced. There is no reason they cannot 
contend that strong property and gun ownership rights are at 
least as much “foundational principles” as some of the rights 
protected or created by the decisions Wilkinson approves. It is 
also quite possible to argue that the Court should extend to 
homosexuals the “equal protection” it extends to some other 
minority groups.49 
Judge Wilkinson’s position is essentially that taken by 
Justice Samuel Chase at the beginning in 1798 in Calder v. Bull.50 
Chase was similarly commendably candid in arguing for the 
power of the Court to restrain legislative power on the basis of 
“fundamental principle,” even though not “expressly restrained 
by the Constitution.”51 Wilkinson’s protest of rule by the Court 
is vitiated by his refusal to adopt Justice James Iredell’s 
response that the Court has no power to declare a law void 
“merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the 
principles of natural justice” which are “regulated by no fixed 
standard.” The Court would simply be substituting its opinion 
of “natural justice” for that of the legislature, which has “an 
equal right of opinion.”52 
Judge Wilkinson ends as he began with a plea for judicial 
restraint, the absence of which has “placed the inalienable right 
of Americans to self-governance at unprecedented risk” (p. 114). 
The courts should not be, as they are now, “the primary agents 
of social change. It is the people at the ballot box who should 
decide, not the people wearing black robes—the many, not the 
few” (p. 114). The great American achievement of 
representative self-government in a federalist system with 
separation of powers has deteriorated into government by 
majority vote of a committee of nine unelected, life-tenured 
lawyers, totally undemocratic and totally centralized with judges 
performing the legislative function. 
 49. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 50. 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
 51. Id. at 388. 
 52. Id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring).  
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It is not so-called theories of constitutional interpretation, 
however, that have “left restraint by the wayside” and “made 
citizens all the more willing to look to the courts to resolve the 
great social controversies of our time” (p. 114). Citizens are 
willing to look to the courts to overturn political decisions they 
disfavor simply because they can, because the courts are 
available and willing—if not sometimes seemingly eager—to do 
so. Judicially enforced constitutionalism means that losers in 
the ordinary political process can become winners with 
nothing more required than obtaining five favorable votes in 
the Supreme Court. Nothing, we can be sure, will keep them 
from trying, as long as this alternative route to political 
victory is available. 
Judge Wilkinson has “been tempted from time to time to 
develop a theory of [constitutional interpretation of his] own,” 
he tells us, but resisted it because “the theoretical enterprise is so 
weighted against restraint that it presages for coming 
generations democracy’s slow decline” (p. 115). So he concludes 
by “offer[ing] only a set of worn and ordinary observations that 
have all been voiced many times before” and which amount to 
urging judges to believe that “the highest virtues of judging—
and of life—are a measure of self-denial and restraint” (p. 116) . 
The problem, as he recognized at the beginning, is that judges 
are not subject to “the normal constraints on the exercise of 
power” (p. 7), forcing us to rely on the judges’ self-denial and 
restraint, which are not characteristic of human beings subject to 
the corruption of uncontrolled power. Judges are not only 
human beings but experienced lawyers skilled in the 
manipulation of language to reach and justify pre-determined 
results. Sitting in a replica of a Greek temple, dressed in black 
robes, and addressed as “Your Honor,” it is not surprising that 
the Justices readily slip from a judicial to a legislative and, 
indeed, a priestly role. 
Our democracy’s decline is probably already too far 
advanced to expect any move by Congress to re-assert its 
legislative supremacy and fulfill its constitutional obligation to 
guarantee the states a republican form of government, unless the 
Court’s recent dramatic and seemingly accelerating interventions 
finally prove sufficient to motivate some rethinking of judicial 
review. Even that remote possibility is more likely to have a 
restraining effect on the Court, however, than Judge Wilkinson’s 
reminding them of the virtue of self-denial while applauding the 
activist decisions he agrees with. 
 
